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SUMMARY 
The Summary of Appellant'; 
Appellant's first brief and is 
OF ARGUMENT 
Argument was fully set forth in 
adopted herein by reference-
Comes now Defendant/Appellant Harold L. Gregory, Trustee, 
for and on behalf of the Martial and Family Trusts of the Albert 
Eccles Family Trust (hereinafter "Defendant/Appellant Gregory", 
"Defendant Gregory", "Defendant", and/or "Gregory"), by and 
through his attorney Jeffrey K. Woodbury in reply and in rebuttal 
to the brief of Plaintiffs/Respondents Allen R. Grahn and 
Josephine M. Grahn, husband and wife (hereinafter "Plaintiffs/ 
Respondents Grahn", "Plaintiffs Grahn", "Plaintiffs" and 
"Grahns") . 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Gregory submits this brief to clarify 
his argument on the issues presented by Plaintiffs/ Respondents 
Grahn. It is Grahns' position that the facts set forth in the 
briefs of Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn and Defendants/Appellants 
Bradshaw and Defendant/ Appellant Gregory clearly established 
that a mutual mistake occurred when all parties relied upon a 
survey prepare by Defendant McNeil. The Court in its Findings of 
Fact found this mistake to exist. The Court chose to remake or 
reform the contract between Defendant/Appellant Gregory and 
Plaintiffs/ Respondents Grahn, chose to rescind the contract 
between Defendant/Appellant Gregory and Defendants/Appellants 
Bradshaw and left the issue between Defendant/Appellant Gregory 
and Defendant McNeil to be decided at a future date or settled 
between the parties. Unfortunately, none of the parties in this 
case was happy with the Court's decision. The 
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rlaintiffs/Respondents Grahn felt that they should not have to 
pay for the additional property that they had received as a 
result of this mistake. Defendants/Appellants Bradshaw felt that 
they should have received the deed to their specific parcel of 
property despite the existence of the road and are unsatisfied 
with the recision. Defendant McNeil recognizing an error, 
doesn't feel that his description was prepared for the benefit of 
Defendant/Appellant Gregory, the Defendants/Appellants Bradshaw 
and the Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn. In any event, as a result 
of everybody's unhappiness, the Defendant/Appellant Gregory has 
to appeal the decision of the District Court in an effort to 
completely rescind the transaction and start over without making 
the errors based on mutual mistake that they made in the 
transactions at issue in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(In Reply to Respondents' Brief, 
"Statement of the Case", Section A) 
Defendant Gregory objects to the statement made by 
Plaintiffs Grahn in their Statement of the Case, Section A, that 
"The Private Drive had been represented, intended and agreed to 
be situated thereon, but mistakenly was not included in the legal 
description." This is Plaintiffs Grahn's argument in a nutshell 
and is not a statement of the case. Defendant Gregory seeks to 
show in their appeal that the Trial Court erred in its decision 
for reformation because the parties' intentions in making the 
contract in the first place were based on mistaken assumptions 
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and that this was not merely a case of mistake in a legal 
description which did not reflect the intentions of the parties. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT 
TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
(Reply to Respondents' Brief, 
"Statement of the Case, Section B) 
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn have objected to the facts 
which Defendant Gregory set forth in his brief which cited to a 
document on record in this case entitled "Stipulated Facts". 
The attorneys for all the parties signed the Stipulation and 
it is part of the record herein. Plaintiffs'/Respondents' 
attorney contends in their brief that the Stipulation was to be 
used for the preliminary injunction hearing only, and that the 
Trial Court, in its Order Granting Injunction, "acknowledged the 
limited purpose for the Stipulation". The Order stated only that 
the Court had received a written Stipulation of Facts "setting 
forth stipulated facts for the purposes of this hearing". It did 
not say, "for the limited purposes of this hearing" or "for the 
purposes of this hearing only", or that the document was not to 
be used again. Further, Plaintiffs/Respondents objected to the 
use of that document in their objection to the Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, but the Court did not respond to that 
objection in its Order denying that Motion. Defendant Gregory 
believes that the Stipulation of Facts, and thus the facts they 
set forth in their brief citing to it, are not inconsistent with 
the evidence and the rest of the record as to the relevant facts 
of this case. However, to eliminate as much confusion to the 
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Court as possible, we further clarify and support the relevant 
facts as follows: 
1. In 1930, Albert and Carolyn Eccles acquired by deed a 
parcel of property known as the "Brookburn property". 
(Transcript, p. 416, L. 1-10) 
2. In 1960 or 1961, Carolyn Eccles and her husband Albert 
divided the property and deeded part of that land, retaining 
approximately 1.67 acres. The Trust is not aware of any requests 
made during that time to legally subdivide the property. 
(Transcript, p. 417, L. 16-20; p, 288, 289) 
3. In 1978, the Eccles conveyed the property to Harold L. 
Gregory, Trustee for and on behalf of the Marital and Family 
Trust of the Albert L. Eccles Family. (Transcript, p. 286, L. 4-
7; p. 287, L. 7-9) 
4. In 19 84, Defendant Gregory divided the existing 1.67 
acre parcel of land at 2811 Brookburn Road to create two separate 
contiguous parcels so that Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of 
the Trust, could build a home on the smaller parcel being divided 
off. The Defendant Gregory hired Scott McNeil of McNeil 
Engineering ("Defendant McNeil") to survey the property and 
divide it into separate parcels. (Transcript, p. 289, L. 16-20; 
p. 418, L. 11 - p. 419, L. 5) 
5. Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of the Trust, 
instructed Defendant McNeil to do a topographic survey to divide 
off and create a buildable parcel of at least one-half acre 
(hereinafter "Parcel 2") in the southeast corner off the 
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driveway, using the driveway as a boundary. (Transcript, p. 222, 
L. 7-21; p. 237, L. 23 - p. 238, L. 3; p. 418, L. 11 - p. 419, L. 
10) 
6. Mr. McNeil understood and was instructed that Defendant 
Gregory intended for him to divide off an available lot, 
consisting of at least one-half acre with the driveway as the 
boundary. (Transcript, p. 237, L. 23 - p. 238, L. 3) 
7. In instructing McNeil, Defendant Gregory intended for 
Parcel 2 to contain at least one-half acre because of zoning 
requirements in that area that required a one-half acre parcel in 
order to build. (Transcript, p. 300, L. 11-15; p. 422, L. 20-23) 
8. When McNeil Engineering did the physical survey, they 
made an error with their instruments while separating off the 
one-half acre parcel. (Transcript, p. 227 - 228) 
9. Consequently, the written survey conformed with the 
intentions of the parties, showing the southeast side of the 
driveway to be a boundary (thus making the driveway part of the 
1.11 acre Parcel 1), and showing Parcel 2 to contain .56 acre. 
(See Survey, Exhibit 1-P of Record, Addendum A hereto) 
10. Since Defendant McNeil had made a mistake while doing 
the physical survey, the written survey had incorporated that 
mistake and even though the survey showed the driveway on Parcel 
1, in reality it was within the confines of Parcel 2. (See 
Survey, Exhibit 19-D of record, which was the correct survey 
later done of both parcels). 
11. Defendant Gregory represented to the Grahns that a 
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half-acre parcel had been separated off by survey, and that they 
could either purchase the entire piece as one parcel, or they 
could just purchase the one-acre parcel. (Transcript, p. 57, L. 
2-9) 
12. While showing the property to prospective buyers, 
Gregory, through his agent, Noel Taylor, represented that the 
property could be purchased in one parcel for $345,000.00 or 
could be separated according to the survey stakes and sold as two 
parcels, for approximately $270,000.00 for Parcel 1 and 
approximately $75,000.00 for Parcel 2. (Transcript p. 27, L. 23-
p. 28 L. 2; p. 45, L. 5-14) 
13. The Grahns decided they could not afford the whole 
parcel, so they submitted an Earnest Money Agreement to Defendant 
Gregory on Parcel 1 with a first right of refusal on Parcel 2. 
That agreement was prepared by Grahns' attorney. (Transcript, p. 
59, L. 19-25; p. 99, L. 12-17; p. 7, L. 16-24; Exh. 2-P of 
record; Transcript, p. 113, L. 22- p. 114 L. 20) 
14. At the time the Defendant Gregory contracted with 
Grahns to sell Parcel 1, the Defendant Gregory did not intend to 
convey more acreage to the Grahns than he did convey by his 
contract, yet his representation to Grahns that the driveway was 
included with Parcel 1 was based on his erroneous assumption, 
while relying on the survey, that the driveway was situated 
within the 1.11 acre parcel which he were conveying. (Transcript, 
p. 208, L. 20 - p.209, L. 11; p. 300, L. 18 - p. 301, L. 9) 
15. The Grahns relied on the placement of the survey 
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boundary stakes which had been placed in error, as well as on the 
representations of the Defendant Gregory, based on that same 
survey, in believing that they were purchasing a 1.11 acre parcel 
of land which contained the driveway. (Transcript, p. 56, L. 22-
p. 57, L. 9; p. 86, L. 8-13; p. 139) 
16. When Grahns and Defendant Gregory and Mary Ethyl 
Gregory negotiated their contract, they were all relying on the 
erroneous survey. (Transcript, p. 94 L. 8-13) Mrs. Grahn 
testified she was relying on that survey even with the first 
offer they made. (Transcript, p. 97, L. ,18-21) 
17. Defendant Gregory on behalf of the Trust intended to 
divide the property into two parcels and intended that the 
driveway remain with the parcel containing the house. However, 
his decision to divide the property at all times was based on the 
survey which showed he had a buildable, .56 acre parcel southeast 
of the driveway. Had he known this was a mistaken assumption, he 
never would have divided the property, and so would never have 
made this contract to sell Grahns Parcel 1 separately. 
(Transcript, p. 209, L. 5-11; p. 209, L. 1-4; p. 301, L. 17-21; 
p. 422, L. 10-23; p. 316, L. 5-17) 
18. Grahns were told that the division of the property was 
based on the survey. (Transcript, p. 94, L. 8-13) The Grahns 
were conscious of the division of the property during their 
negotiations because they could not afford the entire piece. 
(Transcript p. 99, L. 12-17) 
19. Defendant McNeil prepared a legal description of Parcel 
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2 as part of his survey of Parcel 2. (Transcript, p. 419, L. 18-
21; p. 452, L. 24 - p. 453, L. 20). 
20. On or about March 18, 1986, Grahns and Defendant 
Gregory entered into an Earnest Money Agreement for the purchase 
of Parcel 1, consisting of 1.11 acres. The amount of acreage 
they were purchasing appeared twice on the agreement, once on the 
first page of the document and once in the legal description 
attached to it. Their agreement also included (1) an option to 
Grahns of first right of refusal on Parcel 2 (referred to five 
times in the option as the "one-half acre" parcel), and (2) for a 
15-foot restrictive aesthetic and geologic easement on Parcel 2 
across the 15 feet nearest the driveway. (See Earnest Money 
Agreement, Exhibit 2-P of Record) 
21. The Trial Court found that 1.11 acres was the acreage 
which both Grahns and Gregory accepted as that which was being 
bought and sold. (Findings of Fact No. 13; Record p. 534) 
22. Grahns accepted the existing survey upon purchasing 
Parcel 1. Mrs. Grahn testified that at one point she did request 
a survey from Mrs. Gregory, but it was not at a time when she 
could get it, and after that Mrs. Grahn did not worry about 
getting a copy because the survey stakes were clearly laid out. 
(Transcript, p. 303, L. 1-8; p. 82, L. 15-19; p. 139) 
23. Grahns wanted a warranty by Defendant Gregory that the 
property was legally divided. Defendant Gregory had been 
receiving tax notices and paying taxes on the parcels separately 
for two years and understood that to mean the land was legally 
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divided, and thus made the warranty that, based upon his 
knowledge of the coui 11:y i:ecoi:ds , 11 ie J ai 1 d was 1 ega 1 1 y d I vIded . 
(Transcript, p. 190, L. 5 - p 191, L. 3) 
24. Josephine Grahn obtained the legal description for 
Parcel 1 from the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office which legal 
description the County presumably prepared from the legal 
description McNeil prepared for Parcel 2. (Transcript, p, 84) 
25. Oi i or about August 1, 19 86, Grahns and Defendant 
Gregory closed on the transaction for the se;e of Parcel 1. 
(Transcript -. rjj, ii. z3 - p. 64, L, . 
26• The legal description for Parcel 1 contained no calls 
to the driveway. (Transcript, p. 465, T. 3-7) 
27 . Tl iere "was no overl ap i n til < *ed ^ascriptions for 
Parcels 1 and 2. (Transcript, p. 239, L. 1-5; p. 327, L, 1-13; p. 
197, L. 4-10) 
28- On September J, ] 986, Defendants B-adshd* entered into 
an Earnest Money Agreement with the Defendant Gregory to purchase 
Parcel 2. (See Earnest Money Agreement, Exhibit 7-P of Record) 
29. On September I, 1986, Defendant Gregory gave written 
notice to Grahns of his intention to sell Parcel 2 to Bradshaws, 
and extended the right of first refusal. (See Exhibit ~-P of 
Record) 
30. Grahns did not exercise their right of first refusal to 
purchase Parcel ? ,
 ti\w\ when the option expired, Grahns told 
Defendant Gregory to go ahead with the Bradshaw sale. 
(Transcript, p. ISf L. 21 - p. 70, L. 9) 
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31. Bradshaws relied on McNeil's survey in tendering their 
September 1, 19 86 offer which was accepted by Gregory after 
Grahns failed to exercise their option to purchase Parcel 2. 
(Transcript, p. 372, L. 11 - p. 373, L. 20; p. 397, L. 21 - p. 
398, L. 15) 
32. After Grahns received notice of the Bradshaws' offer 
and before their option expired, Josephine Grahn contacted 
Christi Bradshaw by phone and informed her that it looked as if 
Grahns were not going to be able to exercise their option, but 
informed Christi Bradshaw that before building on Parcel 2, 
Bradshaws would need to subdivide the property because it was not 
legally subdivided. (Transcript, p. 375) 
33. Shortly thereafter Defendant Gregory and Defendants 
Bradshaw applied for and went through the subdivision process for 
Parcel 2 and the subdivision was approved. (Transcript, p. 410, 
L. 1-8; p. 372, L. 11 - p. 373, L. 9; p. 167, L. 20 -p. 168, L. 
3) 
34. Salt Lake County Zoning ordinances require parcels of 
land to contain at least one half acre in the zone in which the 
property in question is located. If Parcel 2 is left with less 
than one-half acre, buildability is also questionable because of 
the grade and terrain. The owner would have to apply to the 
Zoning and Planning Commission for a variance, if the Defendant 
Gregory is left with less than a half acre, and there is no 
guarantee a variance would be granted. In fact, it took a long 
time for Zoning to approve a permit for Bradshaws' existing house 
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plan on the property because of the Zoning Commissions' concern 
over the steepness of the slope on the property, (Transcript, p. 
264, L. 1-25; p. 265, L. 1 -15; p. 268, I 6 p. 269, L. 2; p. 
185, L. 22 • 186, L. 6) 
35. i . October 1] , ] 9 86, Dean Bradshaw discovered by 
measurement on Parcel 2 that the driveway was apparently not 
located where indicated and was instead located within the 
acreage he 1 lad pu rchased for Parcel 2 Measuring beyond t:.l: :ie 
driveway, there was inadequate land between the driveway and the 
southeastern boundary of the property to locate his home. 
Bradshaws immediately advised Defendant Gregory or -ne ^rorlem 
and Gregory contacted Defendant McNeil, (Transcript, p, 169, L. 
20 - , - L. 14 - p 383, I i 4) 
36. Defendant Gregory did not contact the Grahns 
immediately about the mistake that had been discovered until 
approximately one day after tl le closi rig on tl le Bradshaw property, 
because until the closing the Defendant Gregory did not 
understand the magnitude of the problem; it was at that time they 
thought they understood the effect of tl le mi stake; a nd they 
obtained counsel to get legal advice on what to do, Additionally, 
Gregory felt that the Earnest Money Agreement he had signed with 
Bradshaws was a legally binding contract, and that therefore he 
had to go through with the closing. (Transcript, p 175,, L. 23 -
p. 177, L. 9) 
37. On the day after the closing with Bradshaws, Defendant 
Gregory gave notice to Grahns of the error and offered possible 
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solutions to the problem created by the mistake. (Exhibit 8-P of 
Record) 
38. The Trial Court recognized that the Earnest Money 
Agreement between Defendant Gregory and Bradshaws was a legal and 
binding agreement. (Transcript, p. 176) 
39. On October 23, 1986, McNeil prepared a revised drawing 
showing what he believed to be the relationship of the Private 
Drive to Parcel 1 and Parcel 2. (See Exhibit 9-P of Record) 
40. Defendant McNeil subsequently prepared a revised survey 
of both parcels, showing the correct boundaries. (See Exhibit 
19-D of Record) (Note: In Appellants' previous Brief, Fact No. 
40, these Defendants erroneously referred to that survey as 
Exhibit 12-P.) 
41. Addendum A attached to this brief is a copy of the 
pertinent portion of Exhibit 1-P of the record, the original 
survey prepared by McNeil, showing Parcel 2 and what the parties 
believed was the nature of the property including the location of 
the road at the time they entered into the agreement. Only this 
pertinent and relevant portion of the oversized exhibit has been 
photocopied as Addendum "A" for this brief so that the Addendum 
maintains the scale of the trial exhibit of 1 inch equals 20 
feet. Addendum B is a copy of the pertinent part of Exhibit 19-D 
of the record, the revised survey, showing where the road is 
actually located on the property. Again, only this pertinent and 
relevant part of the oversized exhibit has been photocopied as 
Addendum B to maintain the same scale of 1 inch equals 20 feet as 
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shown on Exhibit 19-D at trial. Zoning ordinances require a 30 
foot front yard set back from the road and a 10 foot side yard 
set back Additionally, there is a 15 foot easement along the 
Southeastern edge of the driveway which Gregory granted to 
Grahns. According to the zoning requirements, the 15-foot 
easement and the revised survey, if the contract is reformed 
pursuant to the District Court's ruling, the buildable space on 
Parcel 2 is great 1 y reduced ai i ::i i s 1 ocat .ed on the steepest 
terrain on Parcel 2. (See Exh. 1-P and 19-D; Transcript p. 242, 
L. 4-13) 
42. Addendum C I s a copy of page A-2 of Exh I bi t 18 D which 
was the drawing made by Bradshaws' architect showing the 
steepness of the slope of Parcel 2, the location of the slope in 
Parcel 2 and where the home Bradshaws designed was to be located 
on the property. (See Exh. 18-D) 
43. Addenda D and E are full-sized copies of Exh ibits 1-P 
and 19-D, respectively, of which Addenda A and B relevant parts, 
respectively. 
44. Plaintiffs ".rah:; •; i ~> not. sei j thei: prior home until 
March 1, 1987, which was three months after this lawsuit was 
commenced. (Transcript p. 116, L. 15-24) They did not move into 
the home oi i Parcel 1 until some sevei I months after this 1 aw su i t: 
was filed, and most of the time and money they spent in repairing 
and/or remodeling the home on Parcel 1 was spent after this 
lawsuit filed. (Transcript, p. lis ;ii; 
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45. Plaintiffs Grahn and Defendant Gregory had an informal 
understanding that since Grahns had "gotten a good deal" on their 
purchase of Parcel 1, and that if at a later time they could 
purchase Parcel 2, Grahns were going to pay higher than value for 
Parcel 2 to even things out in the long run. (Transcript p. 125) 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THERE WAS ONLY ONE MISTAKE MADE BY THE 
PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT IN QUESTION - MISTAKEN 
ASSUMPTIONS BASED UPON AN ERRONEOUS SURVEY 
(In Reply to Point I of Respondents' Brief) 
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn, in their brief, assert that 
there were two distinct mistakes made by the parties, one mutual 
and one unilateral. The facts, however, clearly establish the 
mistake in this transaction was a reliance placed on an erroneous 
survey. All parties relied on the survey which was erroneous and 
as a result all parties to the transaction misunderstood the 
nature of the property. As a result of the mistaken survey, the 
parties made a series of errors. The Plaintiffs/Respondents 
Grahn thought they were buying 1.11 acres which included a road. 
The Defendants/Appellants Bradshaw thought they had at least a 
half acre not including a road. These were in fact 
representations made by the Defendant/Appellant Gregory based 
upon a survey he had previously obtained from Defendant McNeil. 
The representations were flawed because the survey was flawed. 
The legal description obtained by Grahns was flawed because the 
survey was flawed because it didn't include the road. The legal 
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description obtained by Bradshaws is flawed because it is 
contradictory to the representation that it didn't inc] ode the 
road. Each of these facts is clearly established by the record. 
The Addenda to this brief illustrates the effect the mistake 
had upon the agreements the parties thought they were making* 
Addendum A is a photocopy of the pertinent portion of the 
original survey upon which all parties relied in making their 
agreement. The sea] e 01 1 tl le survey i s one inch equals twenty 
feet, which has not been altered in the photocopy according to 
the original survey. To determine the full effect the mistake 
had upon the agreed exchange of performance, the Court should 
review the parties' intent with respect to Parcel A. The parties 
intended to sell the parcel as a buildable lot. The Gregorys 
intended the lot be separated from the 1.11 acre parcel to allow 
Barbara Danielson, a beneficiary of the trust, to build a home. 
That was the Gregorys intent when they requested the original 
survey. The Court should then review the buildable space of the 
original survey and compare it with the buildable space of the 
revised survey and the affect the Court's ruling would have on 
the agreed exchange of performances under the Contracts and the 
buildable space. 
If the Court looked at Exhibit "A"r the original survey, and 
drew lines which reflected the 30 foot set back from Brookburn 
Road (the heavy black line at the bottom of the page), and a ten 
foot set back on the side yard, and the 15 foot easement along 
the southern edge of the drive way, which Gregory granted to 
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Grahns, the Court could see the buildable space on the property 
the parties thought they were buying and selling. The lines 
drawn, according to scale, would be one and one-half inches for 
30 feet, three quarters of an inch for fifteen feet and one-half 
inch for ten feet. 
Addendum D is a photo of transparency copy of the revised 
survey showing the actual location of the road with respect to 
the legal description of the property. Using the same zoning set 
back and easement distances, the Court could also draw the lines 
showing the buildable space on the property with respect to where 
the road actually lies. Because of the location of the road 
being farther from the property line and because of the easement, 
the Court can clearly see that if the trial court's ruling of 
reformation is allowed to stand, the buildable space is 
significantly reduced. As well, the new parcel is no longer in 
compliance with zoning requirements that require a minimum of a 
half acre in order to construct a residence. 
Addendum MC" shows the steepness of the slope and shows that 
the slope is steepest in the buildable portion of the lot. The 
two parcels are, therefore, materially different and demonstrate 
the drastic effect the mistake had on the agreements between the 
parties. 
The Trial Court found that 1.11 acres was the acreage which 
both Grahns and Gregory accepted as that which the parties 
intended to buy and sell. (Finding of Fact No. 13, Record, p. 
534) The Earnest Money Agreement executed by Plaintiffs Grahn 
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says Defendant Gregory was selling 1.11 acres. (Exhibit 2-P of 
Record) This agreemei it was drafted by t .he Plaint:! ffs Grahn, so 
they had to have understood this issue of fact. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Grahn had been informed of the way the 
property had been divided according to the survey. They were 
shown the survey stakes which indicated the driveway as the 
boundary between the two parcels as divided when surveyed. They 
were told, based on the survey, that Parcel 2 contained one-half 
acre beyond the driveway and that Parcel 1 contained 
approximately one acre i nc 1 ud I ng the • diri veway. At that point, 
the Defendant/Appellant's intentions, while relying on the 
survey, also became the Grahns' intentions while relying on the 
survey. Mrs. Glial u I also testified she was relying on the survey. 
Mrs. Grahn also testified she was relying on that survey, even 
with the first offer they made. (Transcript, p. 94, L. 8-13) 
(Transcript, p. 97, L. 18-21) 
Defendant/Appellant Gregory had instructed the surveyor, 
Defendant McNeil, to divide off at least a half-acre using the 
driveway as a boundary if possible. The Defendant Gregory 
intended Parcel 2 to have contained at least one-half acre 
because the Trust believed it needed at least one-half acre to 
comply with zoning ordinances and also that this was a minimum 
for the parcel to be buildable. (Testimony of Mrs. Danielson, 
Transcript, p. 422, L. 20-23) Defendant McNeil's sur vey si lowed 
that he had attempted to do this and everyone innocently and 
justifiably relied on the erroneous survey. Had the parties 
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known that the surveyor had made a mistake, the Defendant/ 
Appellant Gregory would not have divided the property. The 
Defendant/Appellant Gregory would not have made the agreement 
with Grahns to divide the property and sell them Parcel 1 
separately. (Testimony of Mr. Gregory, Transcript, p. 316, L. 5-
17; Testimony of Mrs. Danielson, Transcript, p. 422, L. 10-23 
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahns' brief states that the legal 
description used by Grahns and Gregory at closing was mistaken. 
(Brief of Respondent, p. 27) In making this statement, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn cite the testimony of Mr. McNeil, 
page 224, lines 17-21, pages 224-228. This testimony makes no 
references to the legal description Grahns and Gregory used in 
their contract. Mr. McNeil is testifying about what he did after 
he found out that he may have made a mistake in his survey. 
Reformation is the remedy when the parties come to an 
agreement, but there is a mistake made in the reducing that 
agreement to writing or where it does not accurately reflect the 
intentions of the parties. But when the intentions themselves 
were based on mistaken understandings about the subject matter, 
there has been no meeting of minds. EQUITY, Bobbs-Merrill 
Company, Inc., 1954, 409. When there is no meeting of the minds, 
the remedy of rescission is the appropriate remedy. 
In reaching their agreement, these parties made assumptions 
about the very way the land existed, based upon a survey. These 
assumptions were mistaken. Defendant/Appellant Gregory made this 
contract to sell Parcel 1 separately to the Plaintiffs/ 
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Respondents Grahn because they thought these assumptions to be 
true. It makes no difference whether the legal description they 
used incorporated the surveyor's mistake. The surveyor's mistake 
was his mistake. The mistake by the parties occurred when they 
made their bargain based on this survey, not when they reduced it 
to writing. They made the assumptions innocently and 
justifiably. The contract between these parties should therefore 
be voidable by either party cine to tl lat mutua I mistake. The 
equitable remedy of rescission makes that possible. 
The Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn contend that there was also 
a unilateral mistake - one made by Gregory in believing Parcel 2 
to contain at least 1/2 acre, and contend that Parcel 2 in fact 
contained less than 1/2 acre. (Brief of Respondents, p. 29) 
Grahns assert that this was only a unilateral mistake because 
Grahns were not concerned with the size of Parcel 2 and therefore 
it was not a material feature to the contract as far as th»--y ••- --* 
concerned. However the Grahns drafted the Earnest Money 
Agreement to divide the parcels based upon assumptions from the 
survey. They relied on the survey stakes in believing that the 
survey created a one-acre parcel which was divided from a one-
half acre parcel. They understood and intended that Parcel 1 
contained 1.11 acres. This is evidenced by the Earnest Money 
Agreement that Grahns' attorney prepared and Grahns signed. They 
also understood and intended that Parcel 2 a Dntained at 1 east 
one-half acre. That is evidenced by the testimony that they 
discussed the "one-half acre parcel" and is also evidenced by the 
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Earnest Money Agreement which mentions the "one-half acre parcel" 
no less than five times in the right of first refusal portion 
thereof. Additionally, Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn intended, as 
did Defendant Gregory, that the driveway be included on the 
parcel they were buying. Unbeknownst to either party, it was not 
so because of the assumption based on an erroneous survey. 
Where either party to a contract would be deprived of the 
benefit of their bargain by reformation, the parties' agreement 
is viewed as being founded on mutual mistake and without a 
meeting of the minds. Under those circumstances, rescission is 
the appropriate remedy. Bourne v. Laioie, 540 A.2d 359 (Vt. 
1987) The Defendant/Appellant Gregory bargained with Grahns to 
separate off a one-half acre parcel and to sell Grahns the larger 
one-acre parcel. Defendant/Appellant Gregory has established 
that the Trust intended and agreed to divide and sell Parcel 1 
separately to Grahns, knowing that Parcel 2 contained at least 
one-half acre beyond the driveway. Defendant/Appellant Gregory 
is entitled to the rescission of that bargain because the Trial 
Court's ruling of reformation would deprive Gregory of the 
benefit of his bargain. 
The Defendant/Appellant Gregory has established that he 
always intended that Parcel 2 contain at least one-half acre 
because of a zoning ordinance that required one-half acre of land 
in order to build. Further, Gregory has established that, had 
Gregory known about the mistake, he would never have divided the 
property. Even if it would be possible now to get a variance, it 
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wasn't his intention to get a variance. The Trial Court's 
decision forces the parties into a contract which they did riot 
intend to make had the parties been aware of the actual facts at 
the time they entered into their agreements. 
II 
THERE HAS BEEN NO CONSPIRACY BETWEEN 
DEFENDANTS IN THIS CASE 
(In reply to additional Argument of Point I in 
Respondents' Brief) 
1. The Trial Court found no evidence of a conspiracy. 
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn accepted the Trial Court's dismissal 
of their claim against Defendant/Appellant Gregory for 
conspiracy. Yet, Plaintiffs/Respondents continue to bring the 
subject of conspiracy into this lawsuit. Conspiracy is not an 
issue on appeal. The Trial Court did not find that the 
Defendant/Appellant had acted in bad faith because no one has. 
It is true that the two Defendants/Appellants Gregory and 
Bradshaw do not have a dispute with each other in this lawsuit. 
Each believes that rescission is the proper remedy for this kind 
of mistake. That remedy would make each contract voidable. Each 
also believes that reformation was an improper remedy and 
prejudiced both Defendants. 
Defendant Gregory stands to be unjustly prejudiced if 
reformation of the Grahns deed is allowed, because not only will 
he lose the Bradshaws' contract since Bradshaws could no longer 
build their house on that land, but also, by giving Grahns a 
portion of Parcel 2, the size and value of Parcel 2 is 
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substantially diminished. Obviously this was not the intention 
of the Defendant/Appellant Gregory when he divided the property 
and agreed to sell Parcel 1 separately to Grahns. The effect of 
the Trial Court's decision therefore was to force the parties 
into a contract they did not intend to make. 
The Bradshaws would certainly be prejudiced by the Trial 
Court's decision of reformation since they could no longer build 
the house they planned on Parcel 2. They would have to either 
rescind their contract with Gregory, or ifi, they could obtain a 
variance, go through designing another, much smaller house. They 
would then suffer loss of all the money and time they incurred in 
designing their home before the surveyor's mistake was 
discovered. 
It is true that the Defendants' attorneys are now members of 
the same law firm. This was not true when this litigation was 
filed and tried; however, since then, Mr. Walker has joined Mr. 
Woodbury's firm. At the time Mr. Walker joined the firm, the two 
attorneys met regarding a possible conflict of interests and 
obtained the consent and agreement from their respective clients 
to proceed. Both the Defendant Gregory and Defendants Bradshaw 
feel they have been prejudiced by the Trial Court's decision to 
reform the Grahns deed and thus both are working toward the same 
goal - reversal of that decision. 
Finally, the rules of this Court provide that attorneys for 
separate appellants may work together, adopting by reference any 
part of the other's brief, or joining in a brief. (Rule 24(i), 
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Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals) 
These parties are not conspiring against anyone. The 
attorneys are working together to save time, money, and 
repetition. Further, it is not the intention of the Defendant 
Gregory that Plaintiffs Grahn lose the property they purchased. 
It is solely his endeavor to have an equitable outcome in this 
lawsuit by having the Defendants Bradshaw and Plaintiffs Grahn 
agree to a new boundary or have the right to rescind and get 
their money back. 
Ill 
REFORMATION OF THE DEED WAS NOT THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY 
(In Reply to Section II of Respondents' Brief) 
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn cite to various treatises 
regarding equitable remedies in an effort to distinguish between 
rescission and reformation. Defendant Gregory addressed this 
distinction in his previous brief at pages 19-27. We will not 
repeat Defendant Gregory's argument regarding the distinction, 
but reassert the same, and only wish to add that in the treatise, 
EQUITY, Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1954, which Grahns cite in 
support of their position, the author states in a footnote at 
page 409, "A mistake which justifies reformation is one that 
occurs not in the bargain itself but subsequent to the bargain; 
it is a mistake in reducing to writing the contract of the 
parties", (citing 60 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 589). The parties to this 
contract made mistakes as to their assumptions and understanding 
of the nature of the subject matter of the contract while they 
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were making their bargain, long before reducing it tc writing, 
which if known, would likely have prevented the contract. 
IV 
THE REMEDY OF RESCISSION IS APPROPRIATE 
(In Reply to Point III of Respondents' Brief) 
The Plaintiffs Grahn argues that Defendant Gregory is not 
entitled to rescission because the Defendant Gregory did not act 
promptly to unequivocally announce his intention to rescind the 
contract. (Brief of Respondent, p. 37) Defendant Gregory did, in 
fact, act as promptly as these facts permitted. First, Defendant 
Gregory sought professional advise to help him understand the 
problem. Gregory needed to have McNeil survey and analyze the 
property. The property had to be resurveyed and analyzed. Next 
Defendant Gregory attempted to work out a solution to the 
problem, to redraw the boundary line whereby (1) Grahns could 
keep the 1.1-acre parcel they had purchased, (2) Grahns could 
still have a driveway for ingress and egress, and (3) Parcel 2 
would still contain one-half acre as intended. Therefore, 
instead of informing Grahns that he was rescinding the contract, 
he offered to move the driveway onto the Grahns' property 
himself, or allow Grahns to rescind and get their money back. 
The remedy of rescission only makes the contract 
voidable by the adversely affected party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS, Section 152 states: 
When Mistake of Both Parties Makes a Contract 
Avoidable. 
1. Where a mistake of both parties at the time a 
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contract was made as to a basic assumption on 
which the contract was made has a material effect 
on the agreed exchange of performances, the 
contract is voidable by the adversely affected 
party unless he bears the risk of the mistake 
under the rules stated in Section 154. 
In the comments of Section 152, the remedy of rescission is 
broken down into three basic elements. 
1. The mistake must relate to a "basic assumption on which 
the contract was made". 
2. The party seeking avoidance must show that the mistake 
has a material effect upon the agreed exchange of performances. 
3. The mistake must not be one as to which the party 
seeking relief bears the risk. 
In this case, the mistake of the parties did relate to a 
basic assumption on which the contract was made - the nature and 
existence of the land itself. Gregory has shown that the 
mistaken assumptions the parties made had a material effect upon 
the agreed performances. Neither party would have likely made 
the contract had the mistaken assumptions not been made. At no 
time in contracting for the sale of the property did the 
Defendant Gregory assume or bear the risk. He was justified in 
relying on the survey to be correct. In fact, according to the 
Earnest Money Agreement, the buyers bore the risk of error in 
size or location. 
If this Court finds that rescission is the proper remedy and 
the contract is therefore made voidable, it will be up to Grahns 
to "elect to rescind and unequivocally announce their intention 
to rescind the contract" if they wish to do so instead of 
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specifically performing on their deed and moving the driveway 
themselves. 
IN ADDITION EVEN IF THE MISTAKE WAS UNILATERAL, DEFENDANT/ 
APPELLANT GREGORY MET THE ELEMENTS FOR RESCISSION BASED ON 
UNILATERAL MISTAKE. 
Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770 (Utah 1985) sets forth the 
elements for rescission based on unilateral mistake. 
1. The mistake was so grave as to make enforcing it 
unconscionable. 
2. The matter as to which the mistake was made related to a 
material feature. 
3. The mistake occurred notwithstanding the exercise of 
ordinary diligence by the Trust. 
4. It is possible to give relief by way of rescission 
without serious prejudice to either party except the loss of 
their bargain. 
A mistake that, if known, would have prevented the contract 
altogether is grave enough to make the contract unconscionable. 
In this case, the Defendant Gregory provided through testimony 
that had he known of the mistake in the survey, he wouldn't have 
divided the property. The division of the property technically 
subdivides the property in violation of the current zoning 
ordinances. Although a variance may be permitted, the lot shape 
and configuration, the topography and dense foliage make the 
practical salability of the half acre parcel a remote possibility 
and at a diminished price. 
A mistake is material if the mistaken feature is known is 
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grave enough to have prevented the contract in the first place. 
The Plaintiffs Grahn has argued the size of the parcel was 
immaterial to them in purchasing the property. However, it was 
their contract, the Earnest Money Agreement, which denotes 
specific acreage amounts in no less than seven different places. 
They were clearly aware of the half acre zoning regulations or 
they wouldn't have notified the Bradshaws of the subdivision 
problems. Defendant Gregory certainly wouldn't have agreed to 
sell the Grahns the 1.11 acre parcel had he know it would have 
effectively rendered the remaining parcel unbuildable. The 
mistaken assumption now known is contrary to all Gregory's 
intentions when he divided the property. 
The remedy of rescission for unilateral mistake is not 
available to a party who made a mistake due to his own 
negligence. In this case, the Defendant/Appellant Gregory did 
act with ordinary diligence. The Defendant Gregory, as well as 
the Plaintiffs Grahn, were mistaken and unknowingly relied upon 
an erroneous survey when they contracted to buy and sell Parcel 
1. Each exercised ordinary diligence in relying on that survey. 
An ordinary lay person who is not a surveyor would not be 
expected to question the correctness of a survey. The Plaintiffs 
make reference again to the conspiracy against this portion of 
their brief in which they allege that the Defendant Gregory does 
not have clean hands. It is true that some time passed between 
the initial discovery of the problem, and the time the Grahns 
were informed of the problem. However the delay was caused by 
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Defendant Gregory's failure to understand the problem and not as 
a result of any conspiracy. 
Plaintiffs Grahn allege that they cannot be put back into 
status quo because they had "sold their prior home, had put at 
least $10,000.00 of improvements into the property, and most 
importantly, had put over 1600 hours of their time into the 
property." (Brief of Respondent, p. 51) Plaintiff Josephine 
Grahn herself testified that they did not sell their prior home 
until March 1, 1987, which was three months after this lawsuit 
was commenced. (Transcript p. 116, L. 15-24) She further 
testified that they did not move into the home on Parcel 1 until 
some 7 months after this lawsuit was filed, and that most of the 
time and money they spent on the property was spent after this 
lawsuit was filed. (Transcript p. 115-116) These Defendants 
maintain that Plaintiffs/Respondents had a duty to mitigate their 
damages, had no losses prior to Grahns' discovery of the mistake, 
and therefore would not be seriously prejudiced by rescission 
except for the loss of their bargain. 
Plaintiffs' attorney in his brief accuses that Defendants 
"push, twist and turn their version of the facts in an attempt to 
make it fit the law of rescission, in the same manner that the 
Ugly Sisters, in the story of Cinderella, attempted to fit their 
feet into the glass slipper." (Brief of Respondent, p. 52) The 
Defendants/Appellants and their attorneys believe that the 
Plaintiffs/Respondents' attorney, as a professional and officer 
of this Court, owes them and this Court more respect than to make 
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such a statement in a legal brief. Obviously, in any lawsuit, 
the facts of the case are going to be viewed differently by the 
two sides. Otherwise, there would be no dispute. These 
Defendants believe their facts to be consistent with the record 
in this case, have not attempted to twist anything, and leave the 
decision with this Court as to whether the facts they have 
represented are consistent with the record. 
V. 
REFORMATION IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY 
(In Reply to Point IV of Respondents' Brief) 
The case of Bourne v. Laioie, 540 A.2d 359 (Vt. 1987) was 
one that involved multiple parcels of land being conveyed in one 
transaction. The Supreme Court of Vermont in that case held that 
the case be remanded to determine the effect of a proven nine-
acre deficiency in one parcel after reformation. The Court 
stated that if the deficiency could be satisfied from other 
acres, and if the Lajoies could still receive one hundred sixty 
tillable acres, which was the number of acres on their deed, then 
the deed could be reformed. 
If, however, reformation would result in the Lajoies 
receiving less than one hundred sixty tillable acres, 
then the deed should be rescinded. Where either party 
would be deprived of the benefit of their bargain by 
reformation, the parties' agreement is viewed as being 
founded on mutual mistake and without a meeting of the 
minds. Under such circumstances, rescission is the 
appropriate remedy... . 
(Id. at p. 363, citations omitted) 
In the present case, the Defendant Trust bargained with 
Grahns to divide the existing property into two parcels, using 
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the same survey that had been used when the property was 
previously divided. They bargained to sell Grahns Parcel 1 
separately since they could not afford the entire property. 
Defendants have established that their intention, in agreeing to 
sell that parcel to Grahns separately, was to leave Parcel 2 in 
tact as they understood it to exist, based upon the existing 
survey which showed it to contain .56 acres, beyond the driveway. 
If reformation is allowed in this case, the Trust will lose a 
portion of the acreage it had on Parcel 2, diminishing its size, 
value, buildability, and marketability, thereby losing the 
benefit of its bargain. 
VI. 
THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS WERE MERGED INTO 
THE DEED BECAUSE THE PARTIES MADE THEIR MISTAKES 
ABOUT THE NATURE OP THE PROPERTY DURING THEIR 
BARGAINING NOT WHILE REDUCING THEIR BARGAIN TO WRITING 
(In Reply to Point V of Respondents' Brief) 
The Defendant Gregory agrees with the Trial Court's finding 
that the description of Parcel 1 designated Parcel 1 as being 
1.11 acres and was accepted by the parties as acreage to be sold 
and purchased. 
The Trial Court's findings of fact states: 
13. The description to Parcel One was 
obtained by plaintiffs Grahn from the Salt 
Lake County Recorders Office. The 
description designated Parcel One as being 
1.11 acres and accepted by the trustee and 
defendants Grahn as acreage to be sold and 
purchased. 
(Findings and Conclusions, 
Record, p. 534) 
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Whether the Court meant for the word "accepted" to be active 
or passive, it seems clear that he was simply saying that 1.11 
acres of land was the amount of acreage that the Defendant 
Gregory and Grahns agreed upon to be bought and sold. These 
Defendants take the position that the Court meant by that finding 
that 1.11 acres was the amount of acreage conveyed. 
VII. 
THE DEED WAS CLEAR, AND EVEN IP IT COULD BE POUND TO BE 
UNCLEAR, THE PAROL EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT THE DEED REFLECTED 
BOTH THE PLAINTIFFS' AND THE DEFENDANTS' INTENT 
(In Reply to Point VI of Respondents' Brief) 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that parol evidence is 
allowed to show intent when the deed is unclear as to what is 
being conveyed. Neelev v. Kelsch, 600 P. 2d 979 (Utah 1979). 
The deed between Grahns and Gregory was clear. The 
description stated 1.11 acres was being conveyed and contained no 
reference to the road. The deed was clear to the Trial Court. 
He found that 1.11 acres was the amount of land the parties 
understood was being conveyed. Since the deed is clear, parol 
evidence should not have been allowed. 
Even if the deed is found to be unclear, the parol evidence 
the Court should look at is the contract (Earnest Money 
Agreement) between the parties and the conversations which took 
place when Grahns looked at the property and when the parties 
were negotiating their contract. 
The Earnest Money Agreement shows 1.11 acres intended and 
contains the words "one-half acre" parcel several times in 
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referring to Parcel 2 in the option for right of first refusal. 
The contract therefore showed Gregory's intent to convey 1.11 
acres to Grahns, reserving a one-half acre parcel on Parcel 2. 
Plaintiffs/Respondents prepared the contract. Therefore, any 
mistake should be construed against the scrivener of that 
document and therefore, it should be construed against 
Plaintiffs/Respondents Grahn. 
When Grahns walked the property with Mr. Taylor, Gregory's 
agent, he informed them that the property could be divided as 
staked by the surveyor, into a one-acre and a one-half acre 
parcel and that Grahns could either purchase the entire piece, or 
could just buy the one acre parcel. Mrs. Grahn testified that 
the division of the property was something they were conscious of 
because they could not afford the whole piece. 
Both parties testified that they relied on Mr. McNeil's 
survey in contracting to sell Parcel 1 separately to Grahns. 
The parol evidence then shows that the intent of the parties 
was to convey exactly what they did convey by deed, and that they 
made a mutual mistake in relying on the survey, which if they had 




IT IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR RESPONDENTS, IN THEIR BRIEF, 
TO REASSERT THEIR ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSAL 
OF BRADSHAWS' APPEAL WHEN THEY HAVE ALREADY 
MADE THEIR MOTION AND IT HAS BEEN DENIED. 
(In reply to Point VII of Respondents' Brief) 
The Plaintiffs have previously filed and argued their Motion 
to Dismiss Bradshaws' appeal in this matter. This Court denied 
their Motion. It is inappropriate for Plaintiffs to now use 
their responsive brief to again assert this argument. After 
having received one stipulated extension of time to file their 
brief, Plaintiffs received, ex parte, additional time to file 
their brief so that they could file their Motion to Dismiss. 
They filed that Motion. It was denied. If they were going to 
make the motion in their brief, these Defendants wonder why they 
asked the Court for more time to file it. 
IX 
BRADSHAWS WERE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS 
AND THEREFORE CUT OF DEFENDANTS' RIGHT TO REFORMATION 
(In reply to Point VIII of Respondents' Brief) 
Defendant Gregory supports the argument set forth in the 
Bradshaw brief, and add the following: The Bradshaws were bona 
fide purchasers because they entered into and executed their 
Earnest Money Agreement with Defendant Gregory to purchase Parcel 
2 before any mistakes or mistaken assumptions were discovered. 
The Trial Court recognized that their Earnest Money Agreement was 
a legally binding contract. (See Transcript, page 176, line 19-
23). However, the Trial Court then made a finding that Bradshaws 
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were not bona fide purchasers, without elaborating on his reason 
for that finding. These Defendants submit that the Court erred 
in finding the Bradshaws not to be bona fide purchasers, which 
cut off Plaintiffs' right to reformation. In this case, 
Bradshaws had no notice of any mistake when they entered into 
their contract with Defendant Gregory, nor did they have any 
notice of any interest the Grahns claimed in Parcel 2. Grahns 
did not acquire that interest until the Trial Court ordered 
reformation of their deed to add the disputed property. 
Bradshaws" bona fide status arose when they signed their Earnest 
Money offer to purchase Parcel Two. For Gregory to have refused 
to close on the property would have been a breach of contract. 
CONCLUSION 
The Grahns purchased and the Defendant Gregory sold to 
Grahns a 1.11 acre parcel of land. Whether Grahns were concerned 
with the amount of acreage or not, that was the amount they 
purchased. The parties believed and intended for the driveway to 
be located within the perimeters of the 1.11 acre parcel being 
conveyed to Grahns. All the parties based this belief and 
intention upon an erroneous survey. The parties also understood 
and agreed upon the division of the property into a one-acre lot 
a and one-half acre lot, with the one-half acre lot being 
situated in its entirety southeast of the driveway. This was 
also an erroneous assumption the parties made based upon the 
existing erroneous survey. These assumptions were the mistake 
the parties made in this case - mutually mistaken assumptions 
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based upon the way the land existed. Had the parties understood 
that the driveway could not be located on Parcel 1 and still 
leave Parcel 2 at the acreage they understood it to contain, they 
would not have made the bargain to separate the property and sell 
Parcel 1 separately to Grahns. 
They made their mistaken assumptions while bargaining, not 
while reducing their contract to writing. The contract reflected 
their intentions to convey a certain amount of acreage. They 
conveyed that amount. But assumptions they made and intentions 
they had while bargaining were based upon mistaken information 
they extrapolated from the existing survey upon which all parties 
relied. 
Even if it could be construed that because of the Grahns' 
lack of concern about the amount of acreage, the mistake was 
solely Defendant's, they are still entitled to rescission based 
upon unilateral mistake. 
The Defendant Gregory did not act to rescind the contract 
because they wanted to work out a solution to the problem whereby 
the Grahns could keep the acreage which they had purchased, still 
have a driveway, and still leave at least one-half acre on Parcel 
2 as intended. Defendant Gregory's proposal of moving the 
driveway onto Grahns' parcel would have achieved this solution. 
The Beneficiaries of the Trust have been deprived of their 
bargain by reformation, since they obviously would not have 
contracted to convey all of Parcel 1 and part of Parcel 2 to 
Grahns. Reformation is only appropriate when the bargain is left 
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in tact, but the writing is reformed to reflect the intentions of 
the parties. 
Since the mistake of the parties was made during their 
bargaining and not in reducing their bargain to writing, the 
contract provisions did merge into the deed. 
The Plaintiffs are appealing the Court's decision to have 
them pay for the extra property. They say that they have already 
paid for it. Yet in her testimony, Mrs. Grahn admitted that it 
was an informal understanding between the Grahns and Gregory that 
Grahns felt they had "gotten a good deal" on their purchase of 
Parcel 1, and that if at a later time they could purchase Parcel 
2, they were going to pay higher than value for Parcel 2 to even 
things out in the long run. (Testimony of Mrs. Grahn, 
Transcript, p. 125) 
Defendant/Appellant Gregory hereby respectfully requests 
that this Court find in favor of the Defendant ordering a 
rescission of all contracts, so that Defendant Gregory can start 
over and make new contracts based on correct assumption. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid by United States Mail, a true and correct copy of the^Reply 
Brief of Appellant Gregory on this r)5F^ day of July, 1990, to the 
following: 
John S. Adams 
Robert M, Taylor 
5525 South 900 East, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Allen Sims, Esq. 
ALLEN SIMS, P,C. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Russell S. Walker 
WOODBURY, JENSEN, KESLER & SWINTON, P.C. 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF OVERALL PARCEL: 
Commencing 25 rods South and 942 feet East from the North 
west corner of Section 35
 9 Township 1 South, Range 1 East 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 5,58 
feet; thence South 220 feet more or less to the center of 
Mill Creek; thence Easterly and Southeasterly along said 
creek 130 feet more or less; thence East 53 feet; thence 
South 37 feet; thence West 53 feet; thence South 187 feet 
more or less to Bennion Tract; thence West 14.52 rods; th 
North 355 feet more or less to center of Mill Creek; then 
Southeasterly along said center line to a point South fro 
the point of beginning; thence North 220 feet more or les 
to point of beginning. Contains 1.67 acre. 
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REVISIONS: 
SURVEY DESCRIPTION OF PARCEL 01: 
BEGINNING at a point on the North boundary line of Brookbuni Road, said point being 930.76 
feet South and 1064.58 feet East from the Northwest corner of Section 35, Township 1 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West 137,455 feet; thence 
North 84.77 feet to the Easterly side of an existing driveway} thence along the Easterly side 
of said driveway the following three courses: Northeasterly along the arc of a 105*00 foot 
radius curve to the left (center bears North 13°16,30,f West 88.815 feet to the point of tangency; 
North 28°15ff29" East 49.55 feet to the point of curvature of a 78.00 foot radius curve to 
the left; and Northerly along the arc of said curve 38.47 feet to the point of tangency; 
thence North 64.60 feet to the center line of Mill Creek; thence along said center line South 
62°57f48H East 40.78 feet and North 59016fl4M East 61.65 feet; thence South 58.5 feet to the 
center line of an existing irrigation ditch; thence along said center line North 85°41,024f 
West 53.15 feet; thence South 241.0? feet to the point of beginning. 
Contains 0.56 acres. 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION FOR PARCEL ALONG BROOKBURN ROAD TO BE QUITCLAIM! D BY I 0k HI C. BENNION 
TO ALBERT ECCLES FAMILY TRUST: 
BEGINNING at a point 921.32 feet South and 825 teet East from the Northwest corner of 
Section 35, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running 
thence East 239.58 feet; thence South 10.00 feet; thence West 239.58 feet; thence North 
10.00 feet to the point of beginning. 
I, Scott F. McNeil, do hereby certify that I am a duly registered land surveyor holding 
license no. 4099 according to the rules and regulations of the State of Utah and that 
I surveyed the above described parcel of land. I further certify that the accompanying 
sketch is a true and accurate representation of the property surveyed showing the 
improvements, etc., that effect the location of the property lints, 
JULY IOL /9B4 \5brftf'rWWt&L. 
*3eGo*z/3u&Kj *Su&'o 
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LEGAL DESCRIPTION OF OVERALL PARCEL; 
Commencing 25 rods South and 942 feet East * from the Northwest 
corner of Section 35, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, and running thence East 5.58 feet; thence 
South 220 feet, more or less, to the center of Mill Creek; thence 
Easterly and Southeasterly along said creek 130 feet, more
 t or 
less; .thence East 53 feet; thence South 31 feet; thence West*53 
feet*; thence South 187 feet, more or less, to Bennion Tract; 
thence West 14.52 rods; thence North 355 feet, more or less, to 
center of Mill Creek; thence Southeasterly along said center line 
to a point South from the point of beginning; thence North 220 
feet, more or less, to the point of beginnixjg. 
Contains 1.67 acres. 
DEED DESCRIPTION OF PARCEL 1; 
r 
Beginning 25 Rods South and 942 feet East from the Northwest 
corner of Section 35, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, $alt Lake 
Base and Meridian; East 5.58 feet; South 220 feet, more or less 
to the center of Mill Creek; Easterly and Southeasterly along 
said creek 89.22 feet; South 64.6 feet to a point of curvature; 
thence Southerly alopg curve ^ to a right radius 78.00 feet, 38.45 
feet, to a point of tangency; thence South 280i5t29* West 49,55 
feet to 'a point of curvature; thence Southwesterly along curve to. 
a right radius 105.00 feet, 88*815*feet; thence South~94.77 feet; 
thence West 102.125 feet; thence .North 355 feet, more or less, to 
the center of Mill Creek; thence Southeasterly along said center 
line to a point South from the beginning; thence North 22p feet, 
more or less, to beginning* 
SURVEY DESCRIPTION OF PARCEL 1:> 
Beginning at a point 412.50 feet South and 942,00 feet East from 
the Northwest corner of Section 35, Township 1 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence East 5.5B 
feet; thence South 202.73 feet to the center^ of Mill Creek; 
thence Easterly along the center of said Creek the following two 
, courses: North 87002*23" East 15,22 feet and South 80O06f30" 
East 66*46 feet; thence South 86.95 feet to the point of curvatu-
re of a 78.00 foot radius curve to the right; thence along 
the arc of said 78.00 foot radius foot curve 38.47 feet to the 
point of tangency; thence South 28015'39M West 49»55 feet to the 
point of curvature of a 105.00 foot radius curve to the right; 
thence along the arc of said 105.00 foot radius curve 88.815 
feet; 'thence .South 84.90 feet to th*» Nn-rt-h Mim^artr n~« ~* 
v& 
3R00KBURN SUB'D 
Creek; thence North 87O02,23ft East along said center of Mill 
Creak 117.16 feet; thence North 203,01 feet" to the point of. 
beginning. Contains 1.19 acres. 
SURVEY DESCRIPTION OP PARCEL 2; 
Beginning at a point on the North boundary line of Brookburn
 ? 
Road, said point being 930.76 feet South and 1064.58 feet East 
from the Northwest corner of Section 35, Township 1 South, Range 
1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence West
 4 
137.455 feet; thence North 84.90 feet to a point on a 105.00 foot 
radius curve to the left (center bears North ISoie'SO" W * ^ } ; 
thence along the arc of said 105.00 foot radius curve 88.815 feet 
to the point of tangency; thence North 28oi5l39" East 49.55 feet 
to the point of curvature of a 78.00 foot radius curve to the 
left; thence Northerly along the arc of said 78.00 foot radius 
curve 38.47 feet to the point of tangency; {fhence North 86.95 
feet to the center of Mill Creek; thence along the said center of 
Mill Creek the following three courses: South 22052,21" East 
49.12 feet, South 66O00f14" East 41,82 feet, and North 56oi3'48H 
East 38.50 feet*: thence South 58.50 feet to the centerline of an 
existing irrigation ditch; thence North 88043,28,f West along said 
centerline 52.99 feet; thence South 206.72 feet to the point of 
beginning. Contains .57 acres. 
I, Scott F. McNeil, do hereby certify that I am 'a duly registered 
Land Surveyor holding license no. 4099 according to the rules and 
regulations of the State of Utah, and that I surveyed the above 
described parcels of land. 
I further certify that the accompanying sketch Is a true and 
accurate representation of the properties surveyed, showing fence 
lines and improvements effecting the boundary lines of these 
properties. 
v//»/j T3 xe>7 
Date Scott F. McNeil, P.E. & L.S. 
License No. 4099 
527.825' 
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N 36' 31' 10" W 94.745' 
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